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TRIALS WITHOUT END: SOME COMMENTS 
AND REVIEWS ON THE SACCO-VANZETTI, 
ROSENBERG, AND HISS CASES 
Terry A. Cooney* 
I 
Twentieth-century American liberals have been, on the 
whole, optimistic. It is not that they have declared everything to 
be fine, ignoring social, economic, and political problems both 
large and small. The list of liberal reform causes, the pantheon 
of concerned individuals, the public traditions of journalistic and 
academic muckraking, and most of all the shift in American lib-
eralism toward support for the positive use of governmental 
power, all make implausible a view of the liberal as Pollyanna. 
Yet in a deeper sense it is precisely the nature and extent of 
liberal activism which manifest a basic optimism. Liberals have 
assumed that the social and political structure of the United 
States is fundamentally sound and virtuous, and, therefore, wor-
thy of preservation and improvement. Moreover, they have as-
sumed that this structure is susceptible to popular pressures, 
open to reformation. Imperfections and injustices, when discov-
ered, could be dealt with satisfactorily through an activist politics 
leading to structural emendation. Liberals have been confident of 
their access to power and of their capacity for successful political 
competition. The combination of faith in the system and faith in 
their ability to change the system has given them a confidence, a 
sense of belonging, an optimism, not shared by other groups in 
America to either the left or the right. 
Law has played an important part in the liberal approach to 
the world, constituting a central element of that system deemed 
worthy of support. Liberalism, it has often been claimed, substi-
tutes the rule of law for the rule of men. Celebrating the rule of 
law as an ideal allows liberals to reject the exercise of power 
without limits, to oppose a system based on the authority of 
individuals, to deny on the level of ideals the existence of a social 
hierarchy. Law presumably gives persons "equality," it con-
strains the aggressions of power, it provides predictability. The 
procedures of the law are, ideally, neutral, and that neutrality 
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gives rise to decisions that represent some consistent measure of 
justice. The legal system has been attractive to liberals not only 
for its ideals, but for its malleability. Open to challenges based 
on reason-that tool which liberals continue to insist is mightier 
than raw power-the law could, liberals have believed, be molded 
by those educated and articulate groups who made up the liberal 
core. And indeed some of the greatest liberal accomplishments of 
this century have been legal in nature. 
The liberals' version of the law had much in common with 
their ideal notions of science-and each contained characteristic 
flaws. In the early twentieth century, "science" held enormous 
prestige among reform-minded folk. Though sometimes pushed 
to the point of caricature, scientific method provided a basic 
justification for mainstream political reforms. Regulatory com-
missions and agencies, for instance, were expected to administer 
in the public interest by determining "fair and just" regulations 
through the application of scientific method. This approach 
would presumably guarantee neutrality and equity in all cases. 
Like law, science was systematic, predictable, impartial, and ra-
tional. 
Yet these ideals of law and science were being undermined 
even as they were becoming ascendant. By the 1920s, both science 
and law as defined by their ablest practitioners were undergoing 
fundamental changes. The assurance· of nineteenth-century sci-
ence that the universe was gradually being stripped of its mys-
tery-an assurance expressed in the promulgation of 
"laws"-had given way to the rather less definite tones of the 
"theory of relativity" and the "uncertainty principle." In the 
legal sphere, Justice Holmes's The Path of the Law and Bran-
deis's sociological briefs had in different ways eroded claims to 
absolute justice and had placed the law clearly within -a social 
context, subject to its shifting winds. At the very least, these 
developments demanded that liberals reconsider their unques-
tioning faith in the rationality and impartiality they glorified. 
Emphasis on scientific method and faith in the legal system, 
moreover, reflected a central weakness in liberal assumptions 
-the means were adequate only when the ends were generally 
agreed upon. Variations of this problem were discussed in the 
teens by individuals as different as Woodrow Wilson and Ran-
dolph Bourne, but one ignored his own insights once in office and 
the other, as an opponent of World War I, had precious little 
influence on most contemporaries. Scientific method as an ideal 
could give a regulatory commission or a city manager some sense 
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of how to proceed, but it could do little to specify positive goals. 
Equipped, perhaps, to make decisions when a consensus existed 
as to the general nature of the public interest, commissioners 
were usually not prepared to resolve adversary situations for 
which they had been given few guidelines. The legal system as 
liberal ideal faced similar difficulties. When a consensus existed 
on the virtues of the system and its procedures, or when desired 
change was agreed upon, there were few problems. But when 
concrete interests became involved, when the ideal of neutrality 
was threatened by the intrusion of social issues, when the courts 
like the commissions seemed subject to political and private pres-
sures, the liberal ideal of law was in trouble. The assumption of 
a general consensus left liberalism vulnerable to challenge, and 
reality proved a nettlesome source of liberal insomnia. 
II 
Few events led to more sleepless nights in the 1920s than the 
Sacco-Vanzetti case. Expecting the legal system to act impar-
tially and to deliver justice, many liberals came to doubt that it 
had done either. Assuming their influence would be felt, some 
discovered a system neither as rational nor as responsive as they 
had anticipated. Forced to doubt the liberal ideal of the law, 
those not able to accept the eventual verdict of the system at the 
least suffered a shock to their optimism and faith, and at most 
rejected liberal ideals on their way to radicalism. For all involved, 
the case taught concrete lessons about the legal process with a 
power Holmes and Brandeis could not approach. 
On April 15, 1920, as a paymaster and his guard were walking 
down the main street of South Braintree, Massachusetts, carry-
ing in two boxes the payroll of a shoe factory, they were shot and 
killed by several men with pistols; two assailants on the street 
were quickly joined by three others in a car in which all five 
escaped. Police were already investigating a bungled attempt at 
a similar robbery in nearby Bridgewater, and the two cases were 
quickly connected as the authorities searched for a gang with a 
car, the members of which, according to witnesses, looked Italian. 
The speculations of Chief Stewart of Bridgewater led him to one 
Mike Boda, the owner of a car being repaired at a local garage, 
for whom the police lay in wait. When four Italians called for the 
car, the police were notified but arrived after the men had gone 
their various ways, having been told they should not take the car 
without license plates. Two of the men who had boarded a nearby 
streetcar were intercepted, arrested, and immediately suspected 
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of both the Bridgewater and South Braintree crimes because of 
their presence at the garage with Boda. These men were Sacco 
and Vanzetti. 
When arrested, both men were carrying pistols; Vanzetti had 
in his possession several pamphlets and four shotgun shells (the 
Bridgewater bandits had used a shotgun), and Sacco carried an 
announcement of a radical meeting at which Vanzetti would 
speak and a total of thirty-two cartridges of four different makes, 
including six Winchesters of a kind no longer manufactured. Both 
men lied about their activities of that evening, as they later ad-
mitted. These facts would play a major role in the coming trial. 
The tell-tale Winchester shells matched a bullet taken from the 
guard's body, and their lies were used to demonstrate 
"consciousness of guilt," an argument on which the judge relied 
heavily in rejecting later motions for a new trial. 
Defenders of Sacco and Vanzetti offered explanations of the 
men's behavior which convinced those ready to believe. Many 
Italians carried guns in 1920; it was a dangerous time. As the 
owner of a fish-peddler's pushcart, Vanzetti had a business to 
protect. Moreover, they feared persecution as anarchists and rad-
icals. Attorney General Palmer's raids and deportations were at 
their peak, and two days before they were arrested, Sacco and 
Vanzetti learned that a comrade named Salsedo had fallen to his 
death from a New York building where the authorities had held 
him incommunicado. On the night of their arrest, Sacco and 
Vanzetti had been seeking the use of Boda's car to hide radical 
literature and warn friends. They had lied fearing persecution 
as radicals, unaware that they were suspected of a much more 
serious offense. 
Sacco had a solid alibi for the day of the Bridgewater crime, 
but Vanzetti, who was self-employed and not so clearly covered, 
was charged. Several customers testified that on the day of the 
crime he had been selling eels for a special feast, but these wit-
nesses were not believed, apparently because they were Italians; 
clearly vacillating and biased witnesses to the attempted robbery 
identified Vanzetti. Sloppy police techniques, a weak defense, 
and a hostile climate helped achieve a conviction. Vanzetti thus 
went as a convicted felon to his murder trial with Sacco; together, 
they faced the same judge who had presided over Vanzetti's first 
trial, the same prosecutor, and a presumption of guilt. 
Three issues would dominate later discussions of the murder 
trial in Dedham. First, problems with witnesses were numerous. 
Initially negative or vague identifications became assured by the 
time of the trial. Conflicting testimony among prosecution wit-
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nesses was brushed aside. After the trial, new witnesses were 
discovered, while several of the original ones changed their minds 
at least once. Despite the seemingly large role of witnesses, Judge 
Thayer ruled on motion for a new trial that the testimony of 
witnesses was not crucial to the verdict and, therefore, not a 
sufficient basis for a new trial. Ballistics testimony created a 
second and ongoing controversy. Experts contradicted each other. 
One later claimed he had been led by the prosecutor into making 
a statement that implied the opposite of his actual findings. Dur-
ing and after the trial, virtually all of the experts who conducted 
tests for either side fell into some sort of disrepute. A third subject 
of controversy was Judge Webster Thayer himself. Indiscreet at 
the very least in making such comments as, "Did you see what I 
did with those anarchist bastards?", Thayer was to Sacco and 
Vanzetti sympathizers the devil-force of the whole proceeding, 
prejudicially calling attention to politics and ethnicity, leading 
the jury to its verdict, sentencing the defendants to death, and 
denying all motions for a new trial. 
The year of Sacco and Vanzetti's convictions, 1921, saw mass 
demonstrations in Europe against the verdict a~d a good deal of 
activity on the part of their defense committee and other support-
ers in the United States. Thereafter, the case simmered quietly 
for five years, unnoticed outside a few restricted circles. A new 
phase of the case began only after the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts rejected Sacco and Vanzetti's appeal in May 1926, 
setting the case on a clear path toward its climax in executions. 
The decision was predictable for lawyers, if not for others. Massa-
chusetts law allowed review only of questions of law, not of fact. 
And as Sacco and Vanzetti's lawyer had predicted, Judge Thayer 
had followed the required legal forms and kept the technical as-
pects of the trial in good order. Over the next fifteen months the 
legal structure which allowed this result would become one of 
many points of attack as the Sacco-Vanzetti case became the 
greatest international legal cause celebre since Dreyfus. 
American liberals and intellectuals were somewhat slow to 
respond to Sacco and Vanzetti, but as they became aroused in 
1926 and 1927, they found in the case marvelous symbols of those 
things they admired or despised. Whether couched in political, 
social, or cultural terms, a good many by the mid-twenties were 
expressing their dissatisfaction with the conservatism and mate-
rialism of national politics and the national mood. Those soured 
on World War I could easily sympathize with the draft evasion 
of Sacco and Vanzetti. The red scare of 1919-1920, which some 
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claimed had entrapped the prisoners, seemed now a sign of Amer-
ican parochialism, as did the visible anti-immigrant biases of the 
period. For those who cared to stress the point, Sacco and Van-
zetti were also workers. In short, they were ideal liberal clients, a 
challenge to the dominant society in a number of convenient 
ways, yet helpless in their imprisonment and particularly in need 
of the humanitarian and righteous aid the liberal longs to deliver. 
For many sympathizers, however, the case meant not triumph 
but frustration. The range of responses charted the varieties of 
liberalism in the twenties. 
Katherine Anne Porter, as one of the last survivors of the 
experience, offered her reminiscences in 1977 in The Never-
Ending Wrong. Her claim that she writes primarily from her orig-
inal notes on the case is confirmed by the episodic nature of her 
account, its occasional confusion and disorientation, and its gen-
eral lack of clear organization and purpose. Yet occasional strik-
ing glimpses of the behavior and attitudes of the protesters of 
1927 make Porter's efforts worthwhile. 
Sacco and Vanzetti, it seems, were greater victims because 
seen in terms of the liberal-radical dream of the worker gaining 
culture and civilization. Not only was Sacco's "small son ... 
named Dante," but these were "Italian peasants, emigrants, la-
borers, self-educated men with an exalted sense of language as an 
incantation. Read those letters!" Porter herself appears the very 
model of a polite liberal whose world was remade by the case. She 
testifies to liberal optimism, since the victims' "friends from a 
more fortunate destiny had confidence in their own power to get 
what they asked of their society, their government." And she 
acknowledges a pretrial idealism, now presumably rejected: "It 
is quite obvious now that my political thinking was the lamenta-
ble 'political illiteracy' of a liberal idealist-we might say, a spec-
ies of Jeffersonian." The essential meaning of the case for Porter 
came to rest in the belief that the ideals of the law had not been 
upheld, that mistakes had been made not through forgivable mis-
judgment but through malevolence, that the rule of men had 
overridden the rule of law. Thus, she can speak with the passion 
of the disillusioned of 
our shared will to avert what we believed to be not merely a failure 
in the use of the instrument of the law, an injustice committed 
through mere human weakness and misunderstanding, but a 
blindly arrogant, self-righteous determination not to be moved by 
any arguments, the obstinate assumption of the infallibility of a 
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handful of men intoxicated with the vanity of power and gone mad 
with wounded self-importance. 1 
Was this confrontation with an ugly reality, this undermin-
ing of liberal ideals, part of a radicalization of Porter and her ilk? 
The evidence of her recollections would give pause to any 
tempted by this conclusion. Though the attempts of Communist 
groups to make pragmatic political use of the case were undoubt-
edly distasteful, Porter is overly preoccupied with condemning 
such efforts. Though she briefly recognizes a good deal of harsh-
ness in some police behavior, she seems to remain proud that "I 
never saw a lady-or a gentleman either-being rude to a police-
man in that picket line, nor any act of rudeness from a single 
policeman," and apparently Porter remains unconscious of the 
ironies in her belief that "the whole police system existed to pro-
tect and befriend me and all my kind. " She reports, "I did not 
know then and I still do not know whether they were guilty," and 
evinces a certain indifference to the facts of the case by applying 
in her "Afterword" Vanzetti's alibi for the day of the Bridgewater 
crime to the South Braintree murders.2 All of this leads toward a 
strong sense that Porter's liberalism had been shocked and per-
haps educated, but not fundamentally changed. It also suggests 
that her real interest, and perhaps the interest of others, lay in 
their own reactions, their own sense of the world. The issues 
raised for intellectuals, for liberals, and for liberalism-questions 
of power and influence as well as of belief-largely superseded the 
matter of guilt or innocence. 
Two short books written in the months before Sacco's and 
Vanzetti's executions, and still readily available, deserve men-
tion. John Dos Passos, who turned journalist to write Facing the 
Chair, identified himself before his involvement in the case as a 
radical. There is much talk of worker unity and classes in this 
book, with its marvelously biting subtitle (Sacco and Vanzetti: 
The Story of the Americanization of Two Foreign Born 
Workmen), and there is much humanity and honest passion. 
Something of the more idealistic and more innocent radicalism 
of the twenties, and something perhaps of the values that would 
in a decade lead Dos Passos away from radicalism, come through 
in his final appeal for action: "The conscience of the people of 
Massachusetts must be awakened. . . . All that is needed is that 
the facts of the case be generally known. . . . Tell your friends, 
1. K. PORTER, THE NEVER-ENDING WRONG 10; 9; 10-11; 13; 43 (1977) (block quotation 
at 43). 
2. Id. at 25 (emphasis added); 32; 58-59. 
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write to your congressmen, to the political bosses of your district, 
to the newspapers. Demand the truth about Sacco and Van-
zetti. "3 He spoke of frame-ups and class antagonism, but Dos 
Passos could still believe in the ideals of moral conscience, reason, 
and public awareness as sources of justice. 
Felix Frankfurter wrote a different kind of essay in The Case 
of Sacco and Vanzetti (1927). As befitted a member of the Har-
vard Law faculty, Frankfurter addressed the legal questions in 
the case, analyzed the testimony of witnesses and Judge Thayer's 
prejudice, castigated the climate of 1920, and reviewed the var-
ious motions and appeals passed on-or over-by Thayer. Frank-
furter maintained an even tone in reminding his readers of the 
liberal canon: "Perfection may not be demanded of law, but the 
capacity to correct errors of inevitable frailty is the mark of a 
civilized legal mechanism." Here there was none of Dos Passos's 
sense of class antagonism, nor of Porter's sense of individual ma-
levolence. Frankfurter saw human error and "extraordinary cir-
cumstances," remedying which would simply "reveal confidence 
in our institutions and their capacity to rectify errors. "4 
Porter, Dos Passos, and Frankfurter represent three of many 
variations of opinion about the case. Each person involved gave 
at least some energy to the cause, some gave most of a year or 
more of their lives. Yet a strong feeling remains that even for 
these three deeply engaged people, even for those whose liberal 
assumptions were sharply jolted, the Sacco and Vanzetti case did 
not really represent any watershed in their lives. Perhaps these 
folk and others achieved a somewhat more complex sense of social 
forces, an awareness of the limits of their ideals. Perhaps, as 
Malcolm Cowley claimed, a feeling of unity among liberal intel-
lectuals developed at the time of the Sacco-Vanzetti case that 
provided a stimulus for those who moved left in the thirties. At 
least, the names Sacco and Vanzetti became part of a litany, 
along with Tom Mooney and the Scottsboro boys, for people 
antagonistic to the prejudices of American society and to its 
allocation of power. The reactions of liberals and intellectuals 
remained, however, more a reflection of forces and opinions 
existing before 1926 than signs of a new order. 
If this is accepted, it comes as no surprise that Arthur Schles-
3. J. Dos PASsos, FACING THE CHAIR: SAcco AND VANzETI'I: THE STORY OF THE AMERI-
CANIZATION OF Two FOREIGN BORN WORKMEN 126-27 (n.d.). 
4. F. FRANKFURTER, THE CASE OF SACCO AND VANZETI'I 108-10 (1927). 
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inger, writing twenty years later, should praise a review of the 
case for demonstrating once again that the old liberal ideal of the 
law was seriously limited by reality. Writing in the "In-
troduction" to Louis Joughin and Edmund M. Morgan's The 
Legacy of Sacco and Vanzetti, Schlesinger commented: 
This book is based upon a recognition, myths to the contrary not-
withstanding, that judicial processes do not take place in a social 
void; that judges are men, not gods; that strict observance of legal 
forms does not necessarily assure the accused of a fair trial; and 
that judges and court systems are themselves judged by the society 
they are designed to serve.5 
In terms of the effect of the Sacco and Vanzetti case, it is not clear 
whether the recognition of limitations to the liberal ideal of law, 
or the persistence of "myths," is the more profound consequence. 
Joughin and Morgan's work remains a valuable survey of the 
case and of intellectual responses to it. This is perhaps the best 
source of general information on defense organizations and their 
politics, and on the verse, plays, and novels based on the affair. 
The problem with Joughin and Morgan is that it is more a cata-
logue than an interpretation. Their book is a place to begin to 
develop an understanding of the reactions to the case, but it is 
certainly not a place to stop. 
David Felix, in Protest: Sacco-Vanzetti and the Intellectuals 
(1965), promises more. Unfortunately the promise is largely 
empty. Felix reviews the case and concludes that the trial was 
fair, the defendants were guilty, and the intellectual sympathiz-
ers were led astray by their own sense of suffering as intellectuals 
and by their attraction to the legend of innocence betrayed. Felix 
treats complex motivations simplistically, adopts a condescend-
ing tone, and generally leads the reader to believe that he does 
not understand intellectuals. Comments such as his claim that 
the case was "the only significant intellectual occurrence in the 
United States between the first World War and the depression"• 
raise questions about his understanding of the period as well. 
Felix had a good idea for a book; a great deal remains to be done 
in evaluating the intellectual and cultural significance of Sacco-
V anzetti. But his particular effort should be read for its occa-
sional insights only by one who has the history of the case and 
some knowledge of intellectuals well in hand. 
Perhaps the best place to start on the Sacco-Vanzetti case 
5. L. JouGHIN & E. MORGAN, THE LEGACY OF SACCO AND VANZETI'I at xvi (1948). 
6. D. FELIX, PROTEST: SACCO•VANZETI'I AND THE INTELLECTUALS 247 (1965). 
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remains Francis Russell's well-known Tragedy in Dedham. 7 Rus-
sell's historical essays tend to be quite readable and generally 
entertaining, almost journalistic in style. Tragedy in Dedham 
covers the case itself quite thoroughly, presenting the evidence 
with accuracy and balance, and surveying the questions, chal-
lenges, and alternative explanations of the South Braintree crime. 
Sacco and Vanzetti's partisans continue to advance.8 Russell is 
weaker in covering technical legal matters, which he treats with 
uncharacteristic brevity. He also refuses to use footnotes, which 
can only infuriate the reader who questions the relation between 
his evidence and his conclusion on a particular point, or who is 
simply curious. Most controversial is Russell's conclusion that 
Sacco was guilty, Vanzetti innocent-a possibility which was 
bound to crop up eventually in a notorious case with two defen-
dants. Relying primarily on third-hand comments from a pre-
sumed "insider," on new ballistics tests, and on impressionistic 
judgments of personality, Russell presented an argument which 
he has been defending ever since. The 1961 ballistics tests which 
he believes showed Sacco guilty, for instance, have been called 
into doubt by the demonstration that the experts conducting the 
tests were deeply committed to participants in and conclusions 
of the original trial. It is unlikely that Russell's book changed 
many minds. 
There is, then, no definitive· book on Sacco and Vanzetti. 
While endless sparring continues over the question of their inno-
cence or guilt, and while speculation with its usual fertility 
spawns a plethora of "explanations" for the crime or the convic-
tions, relatively little academic effort has been devoted to consid-
ering the implications of the case or to examining in any depth 
its significance for particular groups. It is assumed -that the case 
has major importance; it is assumed that its importance for liber-
als was great; but few can readily discuss with any precision why 
they believe these things to be so. 
7. F. RUSSELL, TRAGEDY IN DEDHAM: THE STORY OF THE SACCO-V ANZETrI CASE (1962). 
8. The most important of the alternative scenarios revolves around the Morelli gang 
of Providence, which presumably pulled-the job without the aid of either Sacco or Van-
zetti, See id. at 283-90. Frankfurter gave a good deal of attention to this possibility. See 
F. FRANKFURTER, supra note 4, at 99-102, 111. The latest and probably the longest explana-
tion of the Morelli thesis may be found in H. EHRMANN, THE CASE THAT WILL NOT DIE: 
COMMONWEALTH vs. SACCO AND VANZE'ITI 404-39 (1969). Ehrmann was the junior counsel 
for the defendants during the last two years of their lives. 
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III 
Twenty years after the deaths of Sacco and Vanzetti, a new 
postwar period and a new red scare formed the background for 
other trials that sought to rival the earlier case in fame. The 
espionage trial of Ethel and Julius Rosenberg tempts one to draw 
parallels with Sacco-Vanzetti, as Rosenberg supporters occasion-
ally tried to do, but such an exercise entertains more than it 
enlightens. The Rosenberg trial simply lacks the resonance of the 
famous cause of the twenties. The Rosenbergs touched few of the 
basic chords of political liberalism. They were rather poor, but 
since Julius was an engineer, they were hardly oppressed workers. 
They were Jews in the wake of Hitler, but the judge and the 
attorneys at their trial were also Jewish. When the subject of their 
ethnic identity has been raised at all, it has usually been to specu-
late that Judge Kaufman may have been harder on them as way-
ward coreligionists. Most promising for any claim to liberal sym-
pathy or martyrdom were their Communist ties and the implica-
tion that in a period of Cold War and the deterioration of civil 
liberties, they were persecuted for their radicalism. Yet this too 
was a weak reed at a time when liberals often accepted the 
harshest repression of Communists if carried on with a bit of 
decorum; the Rosenbergs' identity as radicals would win them 
support only after the contemporary mood had passed. What 
made the Rosenberg case a celebrated cause was not their sym-
bolic status, nor their conviction over strong claims of innocence, 
but the death penalty. 
The Rosenbergs' problems grew out of the confession of a 
German-born British scientist, Klaus Fuchs, in February, 1950, 
that he had given information on the atomic experiments at Los 
Alamos to the Soviet Union. In May, an American named Harry 
Gold admitted that he had served as a contact for Fuchs in 1944-
1945. In June, David Greenglass, who had been an army machin-
ist working at Los Alamos, confessed to handing materials over 
to Gold in 1945. In July 1950, Julius Rosenberg, Greenglass's 
brother-in-law and sometime business partner, was charged with 
having recruited Greenglass as a spy, and in August, Ethel Green-
glass Rosenberg was arrested and accused of being part of the 
conspiracy. The Rosenbergs were tried in March 1951 along with 
Morton Sobell, a former classmate of Julius and a somewhat 
tangential figure in the case; all three were found guilty. 
The basic conflict at the trial lay between the testimony of 
David and Ruth Greenglass and that of Julius and Ethel Rosen-
berg. According to the Greenglasses, Julius and Ethel had ap-
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proached Ruth to ask David to contribute to world peace by shar-
ing information with America's ally, the Soviet Union, and in the 
process had told Ruth and David for the first time that David was 
working on the atomic bomb. David began to provide information 
for which the Greenglasses were given money. At one point, Julius 
reportedly cut the side of a Jello box irregularly, giving one half 
to the Greenglasses and saving the other as an identifying device 
for a contact person. This second half came to light again in the 
hands of Harry Gold, to whom Greenglass gave more information. 
With the approval, even encouragement, of Julius's defense attor-
ney, Emmanuel Bloch, the materials transferred by Greenglass 
were shrouded in great secrecy at the trial. Such secrecy probably 
fostered in the jury the belief that swept most of the country, that 
the "secret" of the atomic bomb had been given to the Soviets, 
making possible their 1949 detonation of a nuclear device. The 
Rosenbergs denied all and continued to maintain their innocence 
through more than two years of appeals carried as far as the 
Supreme Court and President Eisenhower .. While in prison they 
wrote to each other a touching set of letters, arousing sympathy 
for themselves as husband and wife and for their two children. 
International furor without a strong domestic parallel failed to 
deter their execution at Sing Sing Prison on June 19, 1953. 
Several books have argued the Rosenbergs' innocence, neces-
sarily concentrating on claims of perjury by the Greenglasses and 
Gold and suggesting a federal conspiracy to frame the Rosen-
bergs. The strongest of these defenses is probably Walter and 
Miriam Schneir's, Invitation to an Inquest: Reopening the Rosen-
berg •~tom Spy" Case. 9 Serious and thorough, the Schneirs went 
beyond a study of the record and did extensive research of their 
own to raise troubling questions about the case. They attack the 
limited material evidence. The photostat of a hotel card, used to 
show that Gold was in the right place at the right time to pick 
up secrets from Greenglass, is revealed to have two dates on it and 
clerk's initials of questionable authenticity. Photographs, intro-
duced as passport pictures at the trial to substantiate claims that 
Julius Rosenberg was urging and aiding the Greenglasses to flee 
the country, are declared by the photographer to be the wrong 
type of pictures for a passport. In both cases, the Schneirs imply 
that the FBI was involved in deception or forgery. 
The Schneirs emphasize the unstable characters of the wit-
9. W. 8CHNEIR & M. 8CHNEIR, lNvrrATION TO AN INQUEST: REOPENING THE RoSENBERG 
"ATOM SPY" CASE (1965). 
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nesses and the suggestibility of Gold and Greenglass. Their evi-
dence demonstrates that the men's stories became clearer and 
more consistent as they heard each others' versions and retold 
their own. The Schneirs outrun their evidence, however, in asking 
the reader to believe in an FBI conspiracy to create a series of 
meetings and a relationship between these individuals that had 
no reality whatsoever. The authors leap from suspicions and 
questions to unsupported inferences and conclusions in dealing 
with both the witnesses and the material evidence. They almost 
ritualistically-for this kind of study-declare that they began 
their investigations with an open mind, but their book is a brief 
for the defense which sees only one side of the case with a critical 
eye. 
Indirectly, the Schneirs do raise serious questions about the 
Rosenbergs' counsel. Why did the defense attorneys not see the 
two dates on the hotel card in evidence? Why did they never 
question the unusual passport photographs? Why did they not 
cross-examine Harry Gold, whose testimony had been badly un-
dermined in a previous trial? Why did they encourage a sense of 
great importance and secrecy surrounding the materials allegedly 
passed by Greenglass? No one doubts the sincerity and integrity 
of Emanuel Bloch, the leading defense attorney. These questions 
are, therefore, rather frustrating for defenders of the Rosen bergs, 
since possible mistakes by counsel afford little basis for claiming 
an unfair trial or a conspiracy to convict. Yet such inadequacies 
combined with the Schneirs' arguments do cast a pall over the 
case for anyone clinging to even a partial ideal of full and fair 
justice. 
The Schneirs' book was understandably attractive to Robert 
and Michael Meeropol, the grown children of Julius and Ethel 
Rosenberg. In We Are Your Sons, 10 they present a story of their 
parents as accused conspirators and of their own lives before and 
after being orphaned. Beyond being a vehicle for autobiography, 
this book assembles the most complete collection in print of the 
Rosenbergs' letters and is chiefly valuable for ,doing so. Because 
these letters are expected to evoke a sympathy generally unre-
lated to the "facts" of the case, it is interesting to read them in 
concert with Leslie Fiedler's "Afterthoughts on the Rosen-
bergs."11 In this essay Fiedler is as usual extreme, revealing much 
10. R. MEEROPOL & M. MEEROPOL, WE ARE YOUR SONS: THE LEGACY OF ETHEL AND 
JULIUS ROSENBERG (1975). 
11. In L. FIEDLER, AN END TO INNOCENCE (1955). 
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about a certain kind of liberal Cold War mentality. But particu-
larly on the letters, he is also, as usual, provocative and interest-
ing. The mind moved by the letters to deep emotion, and the 
mind attracted by Fiedler's analysis, were equally genuine con-
temporary representatives of liberalism. 
The Meeropols do not stop with their stories and the letters. 
A final section of the book purports to explain why the Rosen-
bergs were accused. Having offered no new evidence or solid argu-
ment, Michael asks readers to accept as a premise that the whole 
case was a "frame-up." Frequently referring to New Left sources, 
many of which are solid enough in themselves, Michael con-
structs a pretentious essay unconvincing to anyone not already 
convinced of the unlimited maliciousness of capitalism in general 
and the American government in particular. Beyond the letters, 
We Are Your Sons has little to offer on the Rosenberg case. 
Perhaps the best-known treatment of the Rosenbergs is Louis 
Nizer's The Implosion Conspiracy (1973). Nizer extensively re-
views the trial itself, with some evaluation, and it is for this 
review that one might go to the book. As a history of the case, The 
Implosion Conspiracy is seriously deficient. One doubts Nizer's 
overblown claims before one gets past the introduction. Charging 
others with obvious bias, Nizer claims he had "no difficulty being 
objective" since he had "nothing to overcome. " 12 This same man 
expresses what can only be called a conservative view of the Cold 
War (Russia did it) and vents his distaste for those who question 
the legal system in any serious way. To call a trial "political" is 
"demagogic" to Nizer. Asking whether the Rosenbergs were 
guilty is "a wrong question"; the right question is whether the 
jury, viewing the witnesses themselves, could find enough evi-
dence to vote "guilty."13 From very early in the book it is clear 
that Nizer, on the basis of his assumptions alone, can reach only 
one conclusion. 
The lawyer-author also touts his "research" for several 
pages. It comes as somewhat of a surprise to discover that this 
seems to boil down to a careful reading of the trial record and a 
few secondary sources, a narrow basis indeed for a full-scale treat-
ment. Nizer announces on his first page that the "hero" of the 
trial, in his eyes, is defense attorney Emanuel Bloch. Yet Nizer 
is aware of the many criticisms of Bloch and adds some of his 
own. He seeks to explain away most of the apparent lapses as 
12. L. NtzER, THE IMPLOSION CONSPIRACY 9 (1973). 
13. Id. at 12, 9. 
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decisions made quickly under pressure and as reasonable in con-
text. The damaging propensity of Julius and Ethel to take the 
fifth amendment on all manner of questions approaching their 
Communist views Nizer attributes to their "Communist credo," 
which led them to insist that this was a proper course.14 Nizer the 
objective reporter assumes much, apparently creating appropri-
ate scenes and dialogue on occasion, but he offers no footnotes, 
no bibliography. 
Why was Bloch the hero? "Because his dedication and emo-
tional involvement in the cause are a shining example of the 
lawyer in his noblest role."15 The reader cannot help wondering 
if many clients would not prefer a lawyer less noble and more 
astute. Naming Bloch the hero is even more disingenuous because 
Nizer has another hero for which he reserves his plumpest purple 
prose-the legal process itself. He revels in explaining points of 
both substantive law and procedure-he assumes his readers are 
arm and arm with ignorance. Moreover, he tirelessly insists both 
directly and indirectly that the "Anglo Saxon" legal system is the 
greatest the world has ever known and that the Rosenbergs could 
exercise every right and received every advantage. Contrary to 
the spirit of his introductory comment that "our judicial system 
is at best an approximation of justice, " 18 Nizer busily glorifies the 
legal process throughout his narrative. The time and space could 
better have been spent considering the questions of the Schneirs 
and others. Nizer avoids the most difficult aspects of the whole 
affair. 
On at least one central point virtually all serious students of 
the case agree-the death penalty was extreme. That the anti-
communism and Cold War mentality of the period influenced 
the sentencing of the Rosenbergs is indisputable after even a 
cursory look at Judge Kaufman's sentencing statement, which 
contains the following lines: 
I believe your conduct in putting into the hands of the Russians 
the A-bomb years before our best scientists predicted Russia would 
perfect the bomb has already caused, in my opinion, the Commun-
ist aggression in Korea, with the resultant casualties exceeding 
50,000 and who knows but that millions more of innocent people 
may pay the price of your treason. Indeed, by your betrayal you 
undoubtedly have altered the course of history to the disadvantage 
of our country.17 
14. Id. at 198. 
15. Id. at 1. 
16. Id. at 8. 
17. Id. at 356. 
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Such extravagant and prejudiced speculation immediately pre-
ceded the imposition of the only nonmilitary penalty of its kind 
in American history. If the Rosenbergs had received a thirty-year 
sentence along with Morton Sobell, it seems doubtful that' their 
case would have stirred significantly more indignation than his. 
New documents being opened to scholars are helping to fill 
out the public's knowledge of the case, though without startling 
revelations that will cause any major change in sentiment. Most 
observers have for a number of years accepted the post-trial 
claims of Rosenberg defenders that the secrets handed over by 
Greenglass were actually ·insignificant and could not have has-
tened the production of a Soviet bomb. This issue is really not 
terribly important to the question of guilt or innocence, though 
an impression that the Greenglass materials were vital could not 
have helped the Rosenbergs with the jury and most certainly hurt 
them with the judge. Recently declassified documents of the 
Atomic Energy Commission have led one researcher to suggest 
that perhaps the importance of the Greenglass secrets has been 
downplayed too glibly. Robert M. Anders has demonstrated at 
least that the AEC took Greenglass very seriously; and Anders 
has argued himself that the secrets were indeed significant.18 
While not justifying Judge Kaufman's sentence, such new infor-
mation tends to reduce the likelihood that there was a widespread 
and cynical government conspiracy to frame the Rosenbergs. 
The story of the Supreme Court review of the Rosenberg case 
has also been filled out by the papers of circuit court judge Jer-
ome Frank, the files of Supreme Court Justices Harold Burton 
and Felix Frankfurter, and FBI documents forced to light urider 
the Freedom of Information Act. Michael E. Parrish has identi-
fied seven substantial issues raised on appeal by Rosenberg law-
yers, traced their history in the courts, and concluded in sympa-
thy with Frankfurter that the high court acted with distressing 
haste.19 Judge Kaufman and chief prosecutor Saypol do not fare 
well in this account, but once again the chief issue seems to be 
the death penalty, not guilt. Parrish closes his account with an 
image of Frankfurter lecturing his Supreme Court colleagues "on 
their own fallibility as men and judges, "20 a familiar message for 
those who had read his essay on the Sacco and Vanzetti case 
18. Anders, The Rosenberg Case Revisited: The Greenglass Testimony and the Pro-
tection of Atomic Secrets, 83 AM. HIST. REv. 388 (1978). 
19. Parrish, Cold War Justice: The Supreme Court and the Rosenbergs, 82 AM. HIST. 
REV. 805 (1977). 
20. Id. at 842. 
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twenty-five years before. 
The defenders of the Rosenbergs carry a great burden; claim-
ing innocence, they must demonstrate the likelihood of it. Insin-
uations or declarations that a government conspiracy existed do 
not suffice in the absence of stronger evidence than has yet come 
to light. Scholars like Parrish point the way to more productive 
research, to considering what this case can reveal about the work-
ings of institutions and the attitudes of significant groups in the 
early 1950s. 
IV 
Yet the question of innocence or guilt will continue to fasci-
nate, and nowhere more than in the case of Alger Hiss, who still 
lives and now approaches the courts once more. The punishment 
Hiss suffered was slight compared to that meted out to Sacco, 
Vanzetti, and the Rosenbergs. This fact only underlines the great 
symbolic significance of the case as perceived at the time and, for 
somewhat different reasons, today. Judgments on the guilt or 
innocence of Alger Hiss are often taken as judgments on whole 
groups of people, on whole periods in the history of American 
liberalism. What strange chemistry could produce such an affair? 
The basic ingredients were Whittaker Chambers and Alger 
Hiss. On August 3, 1948, testifying before the House Committee 
,on Un-American Activities, Whittaker Chambers named Alger 
Hiss as one member of a Communist apparatus in Washington, 
D.C., in the mid-1930s. Chambers had been telling his story off 
and on for several years to the State Department, to the FBI, to 
whomever seemed interested. But in 1948, Chambers' accusa-
tions and his list of names made the newspapers, threatening 
particularly the reputation of Hiss, who was then the President 
of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Hiss re-
quested and received the opportunity to testify before HUAC two 
days after Chambers, at which time he denied knowing any per-
son named "Chambers" and insisted he had never sympathized 
with communism or associated with Communists. Further testi-
mony led to a confrontation in a hotel room between Chambers 
and Hiss-orchestrated by young Congressman Richard Nixon 
somewhat to the disadvantage of Hiss-where Hiss identified 
Chambers as a man he had known briefly and casually in the 
mid-thirties as a journalist named "Crosley." Challenged by Hiss 
to repeat his accusation without the protections of congressional 
immunity, Chambers did so on the national radio program, Meet 
the Press, on August 27. A month later, after a delay that has 
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given rise to much speculation, Hiss filed suit for defamation in 
a Baltimore federal court. 
To this point, Chambers had accused Hiss only of having 
been a Communist and had denied that espionage had occurred. 
As a result of questioning in connection with Hiss's lawsuit, and 
perhaps fearing he was more likely to be indicted for perjury than 
Hiss, Chambers altered his story and produced, first, copies of 
State Department documents and, later, microfilms of additional 
material, most of which he claimed Hiss had handed over to him. 
On December 15, 1948, Hiss was indicted for perjury-with the 
clear message that the charge would have been espionage if feasi-
ble-by a federal grand jury in New York. Hiss was tried once 
between May and July of 1949 in a trial which ended in a hung 
jury with an eight (guilty) to four vote. A second trial from Nov-
ember 1949 to January 1950 led to a conviction and a five-year 
sentence. 
Hiss had been charged with two counts of perjury: first, that 
he had indeed given government documents to Chambers; sec-
ond, that he did see and converse with Chambers after 1936, 
particularly in the first three months of 1938, the period from 
which most of the documents came. A broader issue at the trials 
and later was the nature of the relationship between Hiss and 
Chambers. The basic confrontation was between the stories of 
these two men; evidence of a longer and friendlier relationship 
gave Chambers credibility, while Hiss attempted to minimize the 
number of contacts. Defenders of Hiss portrayed Chambers as a 
chronic and pathetic liar. The documents they explained as un-
important, as obtained from sources other than Hiss, as gathered 
from trash or unguarded papers, or as forgeries. Since each detail 
of Chambers's story and of Hiss's alternative version impinges on 
the matter of credibility, since any unexplained document could 
provide a telling link, arguments about the case became enor-
mously detailed and complex. The passion with which they are 
today pursued once again suggests that much more was, and is, 
at stake than the reputation of one man. 
Alistair Cooke, in one of the earliest and most balanced treat-
ments of the case, recognized and squarely faced the larger impli-
cations of the Hiss-Chambers confrontation in titling his book, A 
Generation on Trial. 21 How could Hiss become the representative 
of a generation? Though he had a somewhat unstable family 
background which is often overlooked, Hiss had, by his college 
21. A. COOKE, A GENERATION ON TRIAL: U.S.A. v. ALGER HISS (1950). 
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years, taken on the image of a highly civilized and highly privi-
leged golden boy. A big-man-on-campus at Johns Hopkins, Hiss 
went on to Harvard Law School where he won election to the Law 
Review and was an academic and social success. His teacher and 
friend, Felix Frankfurter (to whom Hiss was close during the 
Sacco-Vanzetti affair), obtained for Hiss a much-prized clerkship 
with Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. After a few years of 
private practice, Hiss joined the staff of the New Deal's Agricul-
tural Adjustment Administration, became counsel for the Nye 
Committee, and moved briefly through the Justice Department 
on his way to the State Department in 1936. Advancing in respon-
sibility, he became part of the American delegation to the Yalta 
conference and presided over the 1945 United Nations organiza-
tional meeting in San Francisco. 
When, as President of the Carnegie Endowment, Hiss was 
accused by Chambers, his name was not a household word. Yet 
what Cooke labelled the "craving for a full-blooded New Dealer" 
quickly began to transform a successful but minor office-holder 
into a "more representative Rooseveltian figure than he was." 
Conservative Republicans on HUAC and elsewhere, frustrated in 
a fifth presidential election as the case progressed, wished to bind 
together the heresies of Communism and the New Deal to make 
clear the muddle-headedness of liberals and the dangers of their 
rule. Some of Hiss's supporters, in response, felt that indeed lib-
eralism and the New Deal, and their own political judgment, 
must be upheld: 
Many Democrats and old New Dealers felt that Hiss was a gallant 
protagonist of the younger liberal crowd that went to Washington 
in the New Deal's first crusade. They feared, as the others hoped, 
that a verdict against Hiss would be a verdict against the New 
Deal. Whatever Hiss or his laWYers might say later, the House 
Committee thus succeeded, before he ever came to trial, in making 
a large and very mixed public identify Hiss with what was charac-
teristic of the New Deal.22 
It is in this sense that Cooke saw a "generation on trial," to the 
obvious discomfiture of many liberals and the probable disadvan-
tage of Hiss. 
Cooke's essay is valuable in another sense as well. His cover-
age of the HUAC hearings and of the trials has an immediacy 
newer books cannot match. The reader learns from Cooke that 
the Committee was apparently favorably impressed with Hiss at 
22. Id. at 8; 9; 10 (block quotation at 10). 
Jan.-Mar. 1979] Trials Without End 853 
first, but watches this mood tum rapidly as Chambers provides 
more details and as Hiss seems to become forgetful and evasive. 
Unknowingly, Hiss confirms a Chambers recollection that he 
had once sighted a prothonotary warbler. Hiss tells of leasing 
-Chambers said loaning-an apartment and giving a car to a 
man he claimed barely to know. Suspicions increase. Cooke is 
critical of the Committee's behavior in many ways and raises 
doubts about the American legal process. Yet on the whole this 
is not a highly evaluative book, nor is it an analysis of the evi-
dence for each side. It is a solid contemporary account of the 
testimony and personalities involved in the Hiss case which 
might be the best place for a reader to begin a relationship with 
the whole affair. 
Numbers of later books have argued for Hiss's innocence. 
The reader can easily immerse himself in works ranging from 
speculative psychology to fantasy. The most recent effort on 
Hiss's behalf to achieve wide attention is John Chabot Smith's 
Alger Hiss: The True Story. 23 Smith's problem is to explain, first, 
why Chambers would present such a story about Hiss if it were 
not true, and, second, where Chambers gof the documents he 
produced in 1948, 'which included four memoranda in Hiss's 
hand, other pages with his notes or initials, and copies of official 
documents typed by Priscilla Hiss on the family's Woodstock 
(according to most experts). 
Smith's answer to the question of motive derives from an 
analysis of Chambers's personality presented at Hiss's second 
trial by defense psychiatrist Carl Binger and developed most fully 
in Meyer A. Zeligs's book, Friendship and Fratricide (1967). Em-
phasizing Chambers's unusual family background of mental in-
stability, this explanation labels him a "psychopathic personal-
ity" and insists that he harbored a strong desire for revenge 
against Hiss, a desire obscurely rooted in some sense of having 
been slighted. Perhaps psychiatry can make a case for what an 
individual might have been capable of-though in this instance 
it does so from a rather limited body of information-but it can-
not judge the facts of the case nor eliminate the details of Cham-
bers's story. Moreover, this analysis of Chambers's life assumes 
a contrast with an exemplary Hiss family, ignoring the suicides 
of Alger's father and sister and the early death of a favorite 
brother. It would seem superficially that Hiss might be as good 
23. J. SMITH, ALGER Hiss: THE TRUE STORY (1976). 
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a prospect for bizarre behavior as Chambers. 
To explain the documents, Smith invokes a variety of no-
tions. Earlier hypotheses reapplied here include the possibility 
that someone else provided Chambers with some of the docu-
ments, and Hiss's own claim of "forgery by typewriter" which 
implies a conspiracy. Smith adds his own visions of Chambers 
pulling notes out of Hiss's wastebasket, playing musical typewrit-
ers in the mid-thirties, and snatching papers from the State De-
partment before they were burned. There are scraps of evidence, 
mostly circumstantial, to suggest that some parts of the scenarios 
Smith envisions were at least possible. But to cover all of the 
types of documents Chambers produced, Smith's entire argu-
ment must be accepted, and this stretches credibility far beyond 
the breaking point. 
The Smith version of the "true story" was constructed with 
substantial aid from Hiss and with complete access to the defense 
files. Since the book's publication, Alger Hiss has given it high 
praise. Smith does not pretend to make a balanced analysis; his 
is a work of partisan appeal. With this understanding,Alger Hiss: 
The True Story can be read with profit by Hiss-Chambers afi-
cionados as a statement of defense positions which remains rela-
tively free of cant and bathos. 
Smith's book was dated, to a degree, almost as soon as it 
came out by the release of some thirty-thousand pages of FBI 
records on the case and some thousands more pages of Justice 
Department materials. These new materials provided one source 
of new information for Allen Weinstein's Perjury: The Hiss-
Chambers Case (1978), which now doll)inates discussion of the 
affair whether favorable or hostile to Hiss. In concluding that 
Hiss was indeed guilty, Weinstein has led some reviewers to 
praise his work with smugness and others to approach their type-
writers with malice in their hearts. The returns are not entirely 
in on Weinstein's book, nor will they be for some time; the chal-
lenges raised to his argument, and the examination of the 
hundreds of new points Weinstein introduces, will provide the 
agenda for Hiss-Chambers work for years to come. Perjury may 
be railed against, but it cannot be ignored. 
Weinstein brings to his task a scholarly sense of thoroughness 
and documentation too often absent from the average journalistic 
treatment. He uses not only those tens of thousands of documents 
obtained by filing a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit, but also 
Hiss's defense files, to which he was allowed free access, and notes 
from dozens of interviews conducted in the United States and 
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abroad. Weinstein's research makes his treatment of nearly every 
significant point in the case fresh and substantial. Though he 
finds Hiss guilty, Weinstein does not follow his many predeces-
sors in addressing merely one side of the case. He identifies many 
flaws in the stories of both Hiss and Chambers and evaluates the 
bulk of the.arguments advanced by Hiss's accusers and defenders 
over the years. (An appendix provides a brief summary and cri-
tique of conspiracy theories developed by Hiss's advocates.) This 
is a solid volume providing substantial support for Weinstein's 
conclusion. 
Precisely because Weinstein has an important argument to 
make, precisely because the evidence he has uncovered deserves 
careful attention, precisely because he has a firm grasp of schol-
arly techniques and understands the scholar's obligations, 
Perjury remains a bit disappointing-because it is strained. 
Weinstein overplays a case that needed no exaggeration. Exten-
sive research must influence through the quality of argument and 
documentation, not by being ballyhooed in the introduction. A 
conclusion should rest on its merits, not be buttressed by a claim 
that the researcher began with a belief in innocence and was 
convinced by the evidence of guilt. (This claim is less than con-
vincing in Weinstein's case to those who know his previous work.) 
Arguments from particular bits of evidence should respect the 
limitations on proof, not move along a rhetorical sliding scale 
from possibility to certainty, from single example to established 
pattern. Weinstein notes in a general statement tfie case's 
"occasionally contradictory, sometimes spotty pattern of evi-
dence, "24 but in the heat of argument he too frequently loses the 
humility and the caution such a pattern should engender. 
In a 1972 American Scholar article, Weinstein raised some 
serious questions about the case against Hiss.25 Interestingly, 
many of those very questions have been raised by disparate re-
viewers who find insufficient response to them in Perjury. In 1972, 
Weinstein was much impressed with two circumstances suggest-
ing possible FBI involvement in building a case against Hiss: 
first, Chambers testified to a four-hundred dollar loan from Hiss 
in 1937 only after the FBI had examined Hiss's bank records, 
which showed a four-hundred dollar withdrawal; and second, a 
number of sources have suggested that the FBI recovered Hiss's 
famous Woodstock typewriter, though it was seemingly first dis-
24. A. WEINSTEIN, PERJURY: THE HISS-CHAMBERS CASE 564 (1978). 
25. Weinstein, The Alger Hiss Case Revisited, 41 AM. SCHOLAR 121 (1971-1972). 
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covered by the defense (implying, to some, possible FBI involve-
ment in the forgery of documents). Perhaps Weinstein found 
these considerations no longer troubling after further study, but 
he slights any explanation of them in his book. Weinstein was also 
troubled in his article by the rather amazing coincidence that the 
one man named by Chambers as a Communist who protested and 
filed suit was the same man against whom Chambers could pro-
duce three types of documents to support his accusation. Why 
were the bulk of Chambers's documents those presumably from 
Hiss, not from others? Perjury does not fully address this issue. 
Finally, the 1972 Weinstein called the question of the date of 
Chambers's break with the Party the "central mystery" of the 
case, since it is vitally relevant to the credibility of Chambers's 
documents. Perjury accepts a later date for the break than Wein-
stein's article asserts, but the book fails to deal adequately with 
any evidence that might have justified this shift. 
Weinstein has not closed discussion on the Hiss case. He had 
little time to review newly released government documents, and 
more such documents will be. available to future researchers. Al-
ready, some of those Weinstein interviewed have rejected his ver-
sion of what they said-nothing new in this kind of situation. In 
early 1979 the text of Hiss's appeal for yet another review of his 
case will appear in paperback. Partisans will not surrender be-
cause it gets cold in the mountains. Yet it remains clear that 
Weinstein has created a major challenge for Hiss defenders. Snip-
ing in reviews and articles will never win the day nor substitute 
for the kind of comprehensive and deeply researched treatment 
Weinstein has presented. 
The problem remains-why has someone with a solid case 
overstated individual arguments almost systematically? Except-
ing the usual privilege to argue one's strongest case, not that of 
opponents, there are perhaps two reasons that tempted Weinstein 
toward polemic-one more intellectual and political, the other 
more personal and social. The first has to do with the fact that 
though the Hiss case is still an important symbol for liberal intel-
lectuals, the issue is no longer defending the New Deal. For 
younger journalists and academicians, the issue has much more 
to do with whether there was in reality any threat from internal 
Communist espionage. Was there any justification for liberal 
anticommunism? Was there a greater threat from government 
agencies serving the interests of a corporate state than from the 
Soviet Union? American behavior during the Cold War is under 
serious scholarly attack. Moreover, the figure of Richard Nixon 
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is a twisting thread linking the Hiss case and the seventies. After 
Watergate, why not frame-ups and cover-ups in the forties? Why 
not, particularly, a blindly anti-Communist J. Edgar Hoover run 
wild? 
The Watergate connection is not terribly difficult to handle; 
as an example it may weaken Hiss's case, not strengthen it. Wat-
ergate revealed as much as anything the ineptness ·of both plan-
ners and operatives in many instances, not the almost perfect 
efficiency in evil required to pull off a complex frame-up. FBI 
documents on the Hiss case create a similar impression; much 
bureaucratic floundering lay beneath the legend of the Bureau. 
Weinstein seems angered that the Watergate mood might have 
given Hiss greater support and sympathy, and perhaps this added 
to the subtle passion of his argument. But the larger issues re-
main those involved in the intellectual struggle over the nature 
of the Cold War and of the Americ.an system. The bitterness of 
some critics, and perhaps Weinstein's own inflation of his argu-
ment, may suggest an acute consciousness of the new symbolism 
of the Hiss case. 
A second reason for the tendentiousness .~f Perjury may have 
to do with matters more personal and social. As Weinstein points 
out, the case stimulated a resumption of the thirties' "internecine 
warfare between 'Popular Frontera' and 'anti-Stalinists. "'26 
Among intellectuals, that warfare opposed, on one side, a good 
many older-American middle-class writers and critics who joined 
the Popular Front after 1935 in glorifying a nativist and popular 
cultural tradition, and, on the other side, a group of more gener-
ally ethnic and urban intellectuals who had become anti-
Stalinists by 1937 and who sought a more cosmopolitan culture 
in which they could share. Hiss stood in close affinity with the 
first group and raised the hackles of the second. Weinstein sug-
gests that in criticizing Hiss many of the anti-Stalinists struggled 
with their own sense of guilt for earlier associations with Com-
munism. Perhaps one could go further and suggest that tensions 
between second-generation intellectuals seeking access to the 
larger culture, and the established genteel groups that tradition-
ally controlled American culture, contributed in some degree to 
attitudes toward Hiss. 
In Lionel Trilling's The Middle of the Journey (1947)-a 
novel, which Weinstein cites, written before the case broke-the 
26. A. WEINSTEIN, supra note 24, at 514. 
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character modeled on Whittaker Chambers is less than sympa-
thetic, but the least attractive personalities are those of a fellow-
traveling couple who coincidentally seem much like the Hisses. 
Weinstein quotes, without seeming to notice the suppressed 
sharpness, Trilling's later comment that "The educated, progres-
sive middle class, especially in its upper reaches, rallied to the 
cause and person of Alger Hiss, confident of his perfect innocence, 
deeply stirred by the pathos of what they never doubted was the 
injustice being visited upon him."27 Even in Trilling, one of the 
least combative and least "alienated" of his group, one may find 
evidence that he is not entirely disappointed to see one of the 
mighty fallen, one of the "ins" out. Weinstein himself is perhaps 
a late bloom on the same bush, just as pleased to find that his 
evidence damns a minor representative of a privileged caste. 
V 
The histories of the Sacco-Vanzetti, Rosenberg, and Hiss 
cases involve many issues, but perhaps none so consistently as the 
question whether persons of whatever class, group, or belief can 
receive a fair trial in America. The liberal ideal of equality before 
the law has, for some, been shaken by each of these cases. Basic 
divisions have appeared. among liberals between, for instance, 
those who primarily worried whether the trials had been fair and 
those who worried whether the convicted could in some way have 
been innocent. Recently, the discussion has moved to a new level, 
as some scholars challenge the liberal ideal of law itself, denying 
that equal justice is the regular product of the legal system and 
suggesting that the frame-up better reflects the reality of biased 
institutions. The doubts instilled by these cases and the challenge 
of solid criticism from the left have perhaps already played at 
least a minor role in making liberal thought more aware of social 
structure, more complex, and more sophisticated. 
Yet these cases have something to teach not only liberals, but 
the bright young scholars influenced by radical ideas as well. At 
their best, radical ideas are marvelous and subtle tools, which 
allow the student to see a problem in exciting new ways. Too 
often, however, they lead to simplistic views about such matters 
as the nature of iiberalism and its functioning in American so-
ciety. The Sacco-Vanzetti, Rosenberg, and Hiss cases are in tract-
27. Id, at 522 (quoting Trilling, Whittaker Chambers and 'The Middle of the Jour-
ney,' N.Y. REV. BooKs, April 17, 1975, at 18, 23). 
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able reminders of the complexity of historical situations. The 
reactions to these cases, immediately and over time, suggest that 
liberalism is not a monolithic set of beliefs to be neatly packaged 
in a formula, but a diverse webbing that scholars must contin-
ually struggle to understand. 
